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INTRODUCTION
In the aftermath of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan in May
1998, the expanded prospect of regional nuclear war' may threaten
South Asian security.2 Although a variety of political and diplomatic
measures 3 will certainly be taken to control this increasingly menac-
ing arms race,4 one that may even come to involve China,' it is im-
portant that all pertinent decision-makers fully understand the stakes.
Should India and Pakistan actually engage in nuclear exchanges,.
either by calculation or by inadvertence, the survivors would surely
envy the dead.7
1. See generally Ram R. Subramanian, Nuclear Proliferation in the Third
World. Region-Specific Cases of India versus Pakistan, 4 BROWN J. WORLD AFF.
95, 95-101 (1997).
2. Indeed, it is even conceivable that by removing the bombs from their re-
spective "basements," the two enemy states will enhance bilateral deterrence and
diminish the risks of nuclear war. This question has already been examined with
respect to another theater of conflict, namely the Middle East. See Louis Ren6
Beres, Israel's Bomb in the Basement: A Second Look, 2 ISRAEL AFF. 112, 112-36
(1995); see also Gerald M. Steinberg, Deliberate Amibiguity: Evolttion & Evalua-
tion, in SECURITY OR ARMAGEDDON: ISRAEL'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY 28, 29-43
(Louis Ren6 Beres ed., 1986).
3. The argument for special or enlarged responsibility for "great power" nations
to take such measures is drawn from codifications expressed in certain major nine-
teenth and twentieth century peace settlements and international organizations, and is
deducible from the persistently decentralized authority structure of international law,
known as the Westphalian System, that emerged in 1648. The role of "permanent
members" of the United Nations Security Council has been particularly significant.
4. In addition to the more commonly discussed ideas about prompt bilateral and
multilateral talks and about implementation of appropriate "hot line" agreements, such
measures are apt to include more long-term confidence building measures ("CBMs").
See Nuclear Weapons: A Comprehensive Study: A Report of the Secretary-General,
U.N. Department for Disarmament Affairs, 45th Sess., at 1, U.N. Doc. A/45/373
(1991); see also ALAN PLATT, ARMS CONTROL AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING IN THlE
MIDDLE EAST (Alan Platt ed., 1992). These measures are rooted historically and con-
ceptually in the 1986 "Document of the Stockholm Conference on Confidence and
Security-Building Measures." See Jorgen Hoist, Confidence-Building Measures: A
Conceptual Framework, 25 SURVIVAL 2, 2 (1983) (stating that CBMs are "arrange-
ments designed to enhance assurance of mind and belief in the trustworthiness of
states and the facts they create.").
5. Chinese involvement could change the dynamics of regional arms competi-
tion. In the event of a nuclear war involving China, together with India and Pakistan,
the consequences would likely be on a vastly greater scale than what is described
herein. In the absolute worst case scenario, Chinese involvement in a South Asian nu-
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Indian and Pakistani leaders should begin by considering an
authoritative 1975 study of nuclear war consequences. Prepared in
the United States by a special committee of the National Research
Council, National Academy of Sciences, the study provides:
In the worst case considered, about half of all nuclear weapons in current
strategic arsenals, viz, 500 to 1000 weapons of yield 10 to 20 megatons
each, and 4000 to 5000 lesser (sic) weapons with yields of I or 2 mega-
tons each, i.e., a total of 10,000,000,000 tons of TNT equivalent are ex-
changed among the participants. No report can portray the enormity, the
utter horror which must befall the targeted areas and adjoining territories.'
The scale of this Report's assumptions is vastly greater than those
that concern us here, namely a plausible nuclear war scenario for In-
dia and Pakistan in South Asia. Nevertheless, the likely kinds of
physical and biological effects are still germane to our present in-
quiry. Some of these effects include temperature changes, contami-
nation of foods by radionuclides, disease epidemics in crops and in
domesticated animals due to ionizing radiation, shortening of grow-
ing seasons, irreversible injuries to aquatic species, long-term carci-
nogenesis due to inhalation of plutonium particles, radiation-induced
developmental anomalies in persons in utero at the time of detona-
tions, increase in skin cancers, and increased incidence of genetic
clear war would involve the United States.
6. It is conceivable that one state might attack the other in such a way as to pre-
clude nuclear reprisal. In such a scenario, which could ensue either as a "bolt-from-
the-blue" first-strike or as a result of crisis-escalation, the consequences of a nuclear
war described here would befall only the state that did not strike first. This does not
suggest a rational argument for aggression or preemption, but rather a compelling case
for maintaining visibly secure and penetration-capable retaliatory forces on each side.
7. See DANIEL FREI, RISKS OF UNINTENTIONAL NUCLEAR WAR 3-4 (1983)
(explaining that inadvertence can include both accidental nuclear war and uninten-
tional nuclear war.) See also LOUIS RENt BERES, APOCALYPSE: NU( LEAR
CATASTROPHE IN WORLD POLITICS 34-35 (1980) [hereinafter BERES,
APOCALYPSE] (noting that as the nuclear arms race continues, the chances of nu-
clear accidents grow); Louis Ren6 Beres, Tilting Toward Thanatos: America's
'Countervailing'Nuclear Strategy, 34 WORLD POL. 25, 25-46 (1981).
8. NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, LONG TERM WORLDWIDE EFFE(TS OF
MULTIPLE NUCLEAR WEAPONS DETONATIONS (1975) [hereinafter 1975 NAS
REPORT] (letter of transmittal by Dr. Philip Handler. President of the National Acad-
emy of Sciences).
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disease that would not be limited to the offspring of the exposed gen-
eration, but would extend over many generations.
In addition, in assessing the likely effects of a nuclear war involv-
ing India and Pakistan, it will be important for decision-makers to
look beyond individual effects in isolation. Interactions between in-
dividual effects could produce calamitous and still unforeseen conse-
quences. Recognizing this some years ago, the United States Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency concluded:
In attempting to project the after-effects of a major nuclear war, we have
considered separately the various kinds of damage that could occur. It is
also quite possible, however, that interactions might take place among
these effects, so that one type of damage would couple with another to
produce new and unexpected hazards. For example, we can assess indi-
vidually the consequences of heavy worldwide radiation fallout and in-
creased solar ultraviolet, but we do not know whether the two acting to-
gether might significantly increase human, animal or plant susceptibility
to disease. We can conclude that massive dust injection into the strato-
sphere, even greater in scale than Krakatoa (the volcanic eruption) is un-
likely by itself to produce significant climactic and environmental change,
but we cannot rule out interactions with other phenomena, such as ozone
depletion, which might produce utterly unexpected results. We have come
to realize that nuclear weapons can be as unpredictable as they are deadly
in their effects.
9
But what, specifically, should concern both Indian and Pakistani
planners when ruminating over the likely effects of a "limited" nu-
clear war? 'o To answer this question, we must first subdivide a hy-
pothetical "limited" nuclear war into three categories: (1) exclusively
counterforce attacks against hard targets; " (2) exclusively counter-
9. UNITED STATES ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, WORLDWIDE
EFFECTS OF NUCLEAR WAR ... SOME PERSPECTIVES 23-24 (n.d.). This report was
produced after the 1975 NAS REPORT. See 1975 NAS REPORT, supra note 8.
10. Limited nuclear war refers to a measured and strictly controlled nuclear ex-
change that is confined to military and industrial targets. The consequences of such a
war between India and Pakistan, including "collateral damage," could conceivably
result in millions of casualties. "Collateral damage" refers to the harms done to human
and non-human resources as a consequence of nuclear strikes that are aimed at enemy
forces and/or military facilities.
11. "Counterforce Strategies" refer to the targeting of an enemy's strategic mili-
tary facilities. Such strategies can be dangerous not only because of the "collateral
damage" that they might occasion, but also because they may heighten the likelihood
500 [14:497
INDIA-PAKISTAN NtrCLEAR IV4R
value 2 attacks against civilian populations:" and (3) mixed counter-
force/countervalue attacks.'4 Moreover, in comparing the plausibility
of these three possible nuclear attacks, it will be necessary to differ-
entiate between objectives and capabilities of India and Pakistan, and
prepare a comprehensive "strategic dialectic" in which India and
Pakistan each anticipate the other's reactions to its own relevant nu-
clear strategies and deployments.'5
I. FORMING A COMPREHENSIVE "STRATEGIC
DIALECTIC"
How shall this dialectic, a framework for understanding South
Asian nuclear arms racing, be prepared? In essence, analysts placed
in the shoes of Indian and Pakistani planners should approach the
of first-strike attacks. In the India-Pakistan context, such strategies could generate
mutual and compelling incentives toward preemption.
12. "Countervalue Strategies" refer to the deliberate targeting of noncombatant
populations such as an enemy's cities or industries. Although the consequences of a
nuclear war between states that embrace countervalue strategies would be especially
grave, the probability of such a war might be lower. This is because the preemption
incentive would be reduced where neither side feels that its nuclear retaliatory forces
are vulnerable to first-strike attacks.
13. See Geneva Convention IV: Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 3516-19 (introducing formal criteria for
discriminating between combatant and non-combatant populations).
14. The especially intense hatred between India and Pakistan must be factored
into analysis. Although it may be perfectly rational for both sides to always remain
within the bounds of counterforce targeting, thereby confining civilian harms to "col-
lateral damage," overriding feelings of hatred could give rise to needless forms of
countervalue targeting. This gratuitous policy could be the case, for each side, in both
the scenario of preemptive attack and in the scenario of nuclear reprisal.
15. At this point it is unlikely that either India or Pakistan has a carefully estab-
lished or recognizable doctrine on nuclear strategy. Hence, there now exists a condi-
tion of mutual doctrinal ambiguity that could easily undermine deterrence in South
Asia and encourage nuclear war. Both India and Pakistan should acknowledge that in
order to meet their deterrence objectives, they must ensure that their nuclear forces are
sufficiently invulnerable and penetration-capable to assuredly destroy the other after
riding out a first-strike attack. Neither state need take any steps to threaten the other's
retaliatory forces. All counterforce "improvements" by India and Pakistan would un-
dermine their security. Such "improvements" would add nothing to invulnerability
and penetration capability requirements, but they would heighten enemy incentives to
strike first. Although it is true that such "improvements" could enhance nuclear war-
fighting capabilities, the net assessment of refined counterforce capabilities must cer-
tainly be negative.
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problem as an interrelated series of thoughts. Each thought or idea
about enemy capabilities and enemy intentions presents a complica-
tion that moves inquiry on to the next thought or idea. Contained in
this strategic dialectic is an obligation to continue thinking, an obli-
gation that can never be fulfilled entirely because of what philoso-
phers call an "infinite regress problem," but that must still be at-
tempted as fully and as competently as possible. Without such a
dialectic, those who work on pertinent security matters will focus
only upon discrete moments in time or static phenomena, such as
numbers of weapons, types of weapons, and leadership personalities
rather than upon appropriately dynamic and generic interactions.
The advantages of a strategic dialectic will depend, in part, upon
the coherence of the overall predictive enterprise. India and Pakistan
do not face a random set of discrete and wholly separate military
threats. Rather, there exists a general threat environment within
which discrete threat components fit. The task for analysts and
strategists here is not to determine in advance each and every spe-
cific threat component, but to identify a framework that will likely
accommodate the understanding of a broad variety of possible threats
for each country.'
6
A. PERCEPTIONS OF ENEMY AGGRESSION
In fashioning such a framework, it will be important to understand
the extraordinary importance of perceptions. Should either India or
Pakistan seek to reduce the vulnerability of its nuclear forces by
some intentionally detectable combination of multiplication, disper-
sion, and hardening, each state could come to believe, erroneously,
that the other is preparing for aggression.' 7 Such erroneous beliefs
16. Jurisprudentially, such threats would fall under the heading of "aggression."
See Resolution on the Definition ofAggression, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR,
29" Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (describing the crime of
aggression under international law).
17. See Report of the Permanent Advisorv Commission of the League of Na-
tions, League of Nations L.N.O. Spec. Supp. 7, at 16 (1923) (containing the Draft
Treaty of Mutual Assistance which first gave defining the question of aggression
particular significance). Since World War 11, aggression has traditionally been de-
fined as a military attack, not justified by international law, directed against the ter-
ritory of another state. See id. An authoritative definition of aggression was
adopted without a vote by the United Nations General Assembly on December 14,
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would be even more likely if the states should simultaneously seek to
further reduce nuclear force vulnerabilities by way of active and pas-
sive defenses. Ironically, in seeking to stabilize nuclear deterrence by
signaling the enemy that its own nuclear forces are not vulnerable to
disarming first-strikes, either India or Pakistan could create the im-
pression that it is planning to strike first. ' Here, each state's attempts
to convince the other that it is not preparing for a preemptive strike
could backfire, creating new incentives for India or Pakistan to actu-
ally launch a preemptive strike itself."
The alternative for each state would be to deliberately disguise ef-
forts at nuclear force protection. Such subterfuge, however, could
carry additional and substantial risks. Should India calculate that
Pakistan's nuclear forces were vulnerable to first-strike attacks, or
1974. See Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, supra note 16. Article I of
this Resolution is based on United Nations Charter Article 2 paragraph 4, enjoining
members to refrain from "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity
or political independence of any state." Id. It also emerges in the definition that the
first use of armed force represents prima facie evidence of unlawful conduct, but
that "the relevant circumstances" may also be taken into account. See id. at 143.
The requirement that to constitute aggression, the first use of force must be "in
contravention of the Charter," clarifies the idea that there may exist some first uses
of force that are entirely lawful. See id. It follows, inter alia. to qualify as aggres-
sion, a use of force must be carried out in order to achieve a prohibited objective.
In other words, animus aggressionis is an essential element of the offense. See it.
18. See generally RICHARD NED LEBOW, BETWEEN WAR AND PEACE: THE
NATURE OF INTERNATIONAL CRISIS 273-281 (1981); Richard Ned Lebow, Deter-
rence: A Political and Psychological Critique, in PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE 25
(Paul C. Stem et al. eds., 1989) (stating that "deterrence is an attempt to influence an-
other actor's assessment of its interests"); Richard Ned Lebow & Janice Gross Stein,
Rational Deterrence Theory: I Think, Therefore I Deter, 41 WORLD POL. 208, 208-22
(1989); Robert Jervis, Deterrence and Perception, in STRATEGY AND NUCLEAR
DETERRENCE: AN INTERNATIONAL SECURITY READER 57 (Steven Miller ed., 1984)
(explaining that deterrence depends on perceptions). This extends to perceptions of
third parties as well as main adversaries. See Jervis. supra, at 57. It underlies the way
in which attempts at deterrence can fail if assumptions are incorrect. See id.
19. Under international law, there is an important distinction between a preemp-
tive attack and a preventive attack. Preemption is the military strategy of striking an
enemy first in the expectation that the only alternative is to be struck first. A preemp-
tive attack is launched by a state that believes that enemy state forces are about to at-
tack. A preventive attack, however, is launched not out of concern for imminent hos-
tilities, but out of fear of a longer-term deterioration in the vital strategic balance.
Hence, in a preemptive attack, the length of time by which the enemy state's action is
anticipated is relatively short, while in the preventive strike the interval is considera-
bly longer.
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Pakistan that India's nuclear forces were vulnerable, each enemy
state might want to exploit the other's current weakness. Moreover,
because too great a vulnerability could encourage the other state to
strike first, and because both India and Pakistan would understand
this calculation, each side could have compelling reasons to launch
prompt preemptive attacks.
B. THE COST-EFFECTIVENESS OF FIRST-STRIKES
In making their preemption decisions, both India and Pakistan-
assuming rational leadership-would need to determine the cost-
effectiveness of defensive first-strikes," which might or might not
meet the tests of anticipatory self-defense under international law."
This determination would depend upon a number of critical and in-
terrelated variables, including: (a) expected probability of enemy
first-strikes; (b) expected disutility of enemy first-strikes; (c) ex-
pected schedule of enemy nuclear deployment; (d) expected effi-
ciency of enemy active defenses over time; (e) expected efficiency of
20. See United Nations Declaration on Principles of International Law Con-
cerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the
Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. GAOR, 25h Sess.,
Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 9 I.L.M. 1292, 1294
(identifying the problem of reprisal as a rationale for the permissible use of force
by states, stating that "States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving
the use of force."). The right of self-defense in international law must not be con-
fused with reprisal. Although both are commonly known as measures of self-help
short of war, an essential difference lies in their respective purposes. Taking place
after the harm has already been experienced, reprisals are punitive in character and
cannot be undertaken for protection. Self-defense, on the other hand, is by its very
nature intended to mitigate harm.
21. See Beth M. Polebaum, National Self-Defense in International Law: An
Emerging Standard for a Nuclear Age, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 187, 190-91 (1984) (ex-
plaining that the customary right of anticipatory self-defense has its modem origins in
the Caroline case, which concerned the unsuccessful rebellion of 1837 in Canada
against British rule). The Caroline case transformed the right of self-defense from an
excuse for armed intervention into a legal doctrine. See id. Following this case, the
serious threat of armed attack has generally justified defensive military action. In an
exchange of diplomatic notes between the governments of the United States and Great
Britain, then-United States Secretary of State Daniel Webster outlined a framework
for self-defense that did not require an actual attack. The framework permitted mili-
tary response to a threat so long as the danger posed was "instant, overwhelming,
leaving no choice of means and no moment for deliberation." Id.
[ 14:497
1998] INDIA-PAKISTAN NUcLEAR WAIR
one's own active defenses2- over time; (f) expected efficiency of
one's own hard-target counterforce operations over time; (g) ex-
pected reactions of unaffected regional enemies and friends; and (h)
expected international community reactions to one's own preemptive
attacks.4
22. The essential components of a multi-layered active defense system would in-
clude space-based surveillance, boost-phase intercept, wide-area coverage, and termi-
nal point defense. Sea-based systems, primarily because of their mobility-
deployability, could provide effective wide-area ballistic missile defense V'BMD")
coverage.
23. In this situation, efficiency must be measured in terms of population protec-
tion as well as retaliatory force protection. In principle, antiballistic ("ABM") systems
can be configured to protect populations as well as deterrent forces. In the United
States, current plans for theater missile defense ("TMD") and national missile defense
("NMD") are designed for dual protection. TMD refers to defenses against shorter-
range theater and tactical missiles that might be used against forward-deployed forces.
NMD, in contrast, would defend against long-range strategic missiles that might be
used to attack urban populations.
24. Such world community reactions would surely be determined more by
politics than by law. Nevertheless, there is now considerable jurisprudential sup-
port for the particular reasonableness of anticipatory self-defense in the nuclear
age. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 933 (1980) (citing WOLFGANG FRIEDMANN, THE THREAT OF TOTAL
DESTRUCTION AND SELF-DEFENSE 259-60 (1964); JOSEPH M. SWEENEY ET AL.,
THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM: CASES AND MATERIALS 1460-61 (3d ed.,
1988) (citing Myres McDougal, The Soviet Cuban Quarantine and Self-Defense,
57 AM. J. INT'L L. 597, 598 (1963). Long before the nuclear age and its particular
exigencies, scholars had supported the principle of anticipatory self-defense. See
SAMUEL PUFENDORFF, III, ON THE DUTY OF MAN AND CITIZEN ACCORDING TO
NATURAL LAW 32 (Frank Gardner trans., 1964). Pufendorff reasoned:
[W]here it is quite clear that the other is already planning an attack upon me, even
though he has not yet fully revealed his intentions, it will be permitted at once to begin
forcible self-defense, and to anticipate him who is preparing mischief, provided there
be no hope that, when admonished in a friendly spirit, he may put off his hostile tem-
per; or, if such admonition be likely to injure our cause. Hence, he is to be regarded as
the aggressor, who first conceived the wish to injure, and prepared himself to carry it
out. But the excuse of self-defense will be his. who by quickness shall overpower his
slower assailant. And for defense, it is not required that one receive the first blow, or
merely avoid and parry those aimed at him.
Id.
Similarly, Hugo Grotius, in his discussion of war that exists in the absence of
formal declarations, explains why the state considering anticipatory self-defense
need not wait for such declarations. See HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE
LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 96 (James Brown Scott ed.. Gladys L. Williams &
W.H. Zeydel trans., 1964). Grotius stated:
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C. DEFENSIVE MEASURES OF THE ENEMY
Indian and Pakistani inclinations to launch preemptive strikes may
also be affected by the other's steps to guard against a preemptive
strike. These measures include the attachment of "hair-trigger"
launch mechanisms to nuclear weapon systems, and the adoption of
"launch-on-warning" policies, 25  possibly coupled with pre-
delegations of launch authority.26 In addition, there is no doubt that
both India and Pakistan will do everything possible to prevent pro-
tective measures from being installed by the other, because of the
[A]s Cicero explains, this justification for anticipatory self-defense exists whenever
he who chooses to wait for formal declarations of war will be obliged to pay an un-
just penalty before he can exact a just penalty; and, in a general sense, it exists
whenever matters do not admit of delay. Thus, it is obvious that a just war can be
waged in return, without recourse to judicial procedure, against an opponent who
has begun an unjust war; nor will any declaration of that just war be required. For,
as Aelian says, citing Plato as his authority, any war undertaken for the necessary
repression of injury is proclaimed not by a crier nor by a herald but by the voice of
Nature herself.
Id.
Lest anyone doubt the authoritativeness of such opinions as an appropriate
source of contemporary international law, one need only recall the reference at Ar-
ticle 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice to "the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various nations, as subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of law." See Statute Of The International Court Of Justice,
art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031 (1945).
25. See Michael C. Brower, The Future of U.S. Nuclear Strategy, in NUCLEAR
WEAPONS AFTER THE COLD WAR: GUIDELINES FOR U.S. POLICY 72, 100-01 (Michble
A. Floumoy ed., 1993) (discussing the various strategic and technological options
available as preemptive strike measures). Launch-on-warning ("LOW") describes a
strategic doctrine that calls for the retaliatory launch of bombers and/or missiles on
receipt of warning that a missile attack is underway. This doctrine, which requires a
retaliatory strike before the attacking warheads reach their intended targets, is some-
times called "launch on positive or confirmed notification of attack" to distinguish
between the possible and actual attack. In United States strategic doctrine, LOW is
treated as one of two primary "prompt launch" options, the other option being launch-
under-attack ("LUA"). Under LUA, the United States National Command Authority
("NCA") would wait until confirmation had been received of nuclear detonations on
American soil before ordering retaliatory strikes. Under LOW, confirmed detection of
missile launches from at least two types of sensors, ground-based radar and satellites,
would be adequate.
26. See BERES, APOCALYPSE, supra note 7, at 86-92 (discussing various means by
which the authority to launch preemptive nuclear strikes can be delegated amongst
various military and elected officials).
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expanded risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks against each
state's own armaments and population centers.:"
D. RATIONALITY OF ENEMY LEADERS
Perhaps the single most important factor in both Indian and Paki-
stani judgments concerning preemption will be the assumed rational-
ity of the other's decision-makers. 2' If leaders are expected to strike
with nuclear forces irrespective of anticipated enemy counterstrikes,
deterrence will not work. For both India and Pakistan, this means
that enemy strikes would be expected even if each state's leaders un-
derstood that the other had "successfully" deployed its own nuclear
weapons, that the prospective target state's own nuclear weapons
were entirely capable of penetrating enemy active defenses, and that
the prospective target state's own leaders were altogether willing to
retaliate.
Faced with a potentially irrational enemy bent upon aggression,
both India and Pakistan could calculate that there was no reasonable
option but to abandon reliance on nuclear deterrence. :' Here, a pre-
27. The great time constraints on decision-makers under prompt launch options,
and each enemy state's obvious uncertainty about thresholds of attack above which
the other's decision-makers would opt for prompt launch, create a number of risks.
Moreover, even if well-defined thresholds were known to Indian and Pakistani lead-
ers, they could be low enough to be seriously destabilizing.
28. India or Pakistan will expect the other to accept or reject a first-strike option
by rationally comparing the costs and risks of each alternative. Where the expected
costs of striking first exceed expected gains, deterrence should be successful. Where
these expected costs are believed to be exceeded by expected gains, nuclear deterrence
will fail. Either India or Pakistan will be faced with an attack from the other, whether
as a "bolt from the blue" strike or as an outcome of crisis escalation. These scenarios
assume a rational, unitary, and value-maximizing decision-maker with one set of
specified goals, one set of perceived options, and a single estimate of the conse-
quences that ensue from each alternative. Thus, the rational Indian and Pakistani deci-
sion-maker is assumed to evaluate alternatives in his strategic environment on the ba-
sis of his preferences among them, to operate according to a preference-ordering that
is consistent and transitive, and to always choose the preferred alternative. An oft-
ignored problem with rationality-based assumptions is that they are concerned only
with preference-maximizing intentions. A state may indeed meet all of the require-
ments of rationality, but may still commit errors in calculation that undermine deter-
rence.
29. In the absence of perceived irrationality, there would be no need to abandon
reliance upon nuclear deterrence. The credibility of either state's nuclear deterrent
would depend not only upon secure nuclear weapons, but also upon secure com-
1998]
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emptive strike could be labeled imperative. The only remaining
questions would be tactical, oriented toward matters of timing, tar-
geting, and configurations of ordinance.
II. POTENTIAL STRATEGIES OF INDIA AND
PAKISTAN
Both nuclear and non-nuclear preemptive strikes" by India or by
Pakistan could lead to nuclear exchanges. This would depend, in part,
on the effectiveness and breadth of the preemptive strike, the sur-
viving number of enemy nuclear weapons, and the willingness of en-
emy leaders to risk nuclear counter-retaliations. The likelihood of
nuclear exchanges would be greatest where both states were allowed
to deploy ever-greater numbers of nuclear weapons. Should this hap-
pen, both India and Pakistan might effectively forfeit the non-nuclear
preemption option, and each could be forced to choose between a no-
mandlcontrol/intelligence operations. To reduce the risks of "decapitation," both In-
dian and Pakistani military planners will have to consider the complex relationships
between invulnerability and pre-delegations of launch authority. This means that an
essential aspect of Indian and Pakistani nuclear deterrence could include expanding
the number of authoritative decision-makers who would have the fight to launch nu-
clear weapons under certain very carefully-defined residual contingencies. Yet, as in
all other aspects of nuclear weapons and military planning, there would be negative
factors to consider. Because the deterrence value of expanded decisional-authority to
launch would require that prospective attackers to learn in advance that India/Pakistan
had taken these decapitation-avoidance pre-delegations. these states might feel in-
creasingly compelled to launch preemptive strikes. Such strikes could fuel new fears
of an intentional first-strike, and/or an accidental, unauthorized, or unintentional nu-
clear strike. Aware of these probable enemy reactions to its pre-delegations of launch
authority, which may be complemented by LOW measures, each enemy state could
feel compelled to strike first itself.
30. See The Future of Smart Weapons, Proceedings from the AAAS Annual
Meeting (Feb. 8, 1992). Following Operation Desert Storm, there was considerable
sentiment within the U.S. military that conventional weapons may be capable of de-
stroying virtually any hard target formerly assigned to nuclear weapons. At the same
time, informed doubts existed concerning the prospect of successful non-nuclear at-
tacks against enemy state nuclear assets. Discussions of Automatic Target Recogni-
tion ("ATR"), in the context of cruise missile guidance technology, suggest that pros-
pects for a conventional counterforce capability against mobile systems are still
problematic. In addition, weapons with the range and payload to attack hardened tar-
gets would have to be extremely large and have to penetrate the ground at very high
speeds. Superhard silos and command centers, designed to withstand multimegaton




longer-timely nuclear preemption and simply waiting to be struck
first.
If nuclear weapons were introduced into actual conflict by India or
Pakistan, nuclear conflict would likely ensue so long as first-strikes
did not destroy the target's second-strike nuclear capability and re-
taliation did not destroy the first-striker's nuclear counter-retaliatory
capability. 3 Thus, to avoid nuclear war and to minimize risks of nu-
clear response, each side will seek to maximize its hard-target kill
capability. Should India or Pakistan, or both, calculate that a first-
strike attack would destroy the target state's second-strike nuclear
capability, they could rationally decide to launch a preemptive strike.
Moreover, should the target state calculate, after absorbing an enemy
nuclear first-strike, that its retaliation would destroy the first-striker's
nuclear counter-retaliatory capability, it could decide, rationally, to
undertake such a reprisal. This second decision, of course, would be
contingent upon the assumption that the expected security benefits of
counterforce reprisal would exceed the expected security costs-i.e.,
that it would suffer graver harms by not retaliating.
III. EXPECTED CONSEQUENCES OF A NUCLEAR
ATTACK
Returning to a more specific discussion of nuclear war outcomes,
analysts now need to identify broadly the expected consequences that
would be common to each pertinent scenario. Medically, the most
widespread and potentially problematic type of injury in any nuclear
attack would be burns. One should consider that in the United States,
at the Massachusetts General Hospital only fifteen beds are available
at any one time for the acute care of bum victims. Just to keep one
such patient alive taxes this exceptional facility to the limit. No
amount of advanced preparation could provide the human and mate-
rial resources required for the care of even a few such patients hos-
pitalized simultaneously in any city in the United States, let alone In-
31. See Burns H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons Versus International Law: Reas-
sessment, in NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND LAW 165. 167-179 (Arthur S. Miller &
Martin Feinrider eds., 1984); Bums H. Weston, Nuclear Weapons and the World
Court: Ambiguity's Consensus, 7 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONrrEMP. PROBS. 371, 376-
390 (1997) (discussing whether the introduction of nuclear weapons into a conflict
would be consistent with customary norms of international law).
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dia or Pakistan. Yet we must assume that tens, possibly hundreds, of
thousands of such casualties would result in every Indian and Paki-
stani city hit by a nuclear weapon.
There can be no meaningful medical response to the overwhelm-
ing health problems that would follow a nuclear attack upon India or
Pakistan. These problems would extend far beyond the uncontrolla-
ble consequences of prompt bum injuries. A burden of cancer and
genetic defects would afflict survivors and future generations. Fall-
out would make blast areas uninhabitable for many months. Most
area water supplies, sanitation resources, transportation capacities,
and industrial production would be destroyed. This raises the ques-
tion: where would the survivors go?
A. LEARNING FROM THE PAST: HIROSHIMA AND NAGASAKI
To understand the magnitude of destruction, one must refer to the
experiences of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The Hiroshima bomb, a
relatively small weapon with explosive power in the range of 20,000
tons of TNT, killed approximately 100,000 people out of a total
population of 245,000. Twenty-five percent of the victims were di-
rectly burned by the bomb, twenty percent died from radiation ef-
fects, and fifty percent died of other injuries. The bomb also de-
stroyed two-thirds of the 90,000 buildings within city limits.
Statistics, however, cannot fully capture the horror of nuclear war.
First-hand accounts offer a much more graphic picture:
There were about 20 men ... all in exactly the same nightmarish state:
their faces were wholly burned, their eye sockets were hollow, the fluid
from their melted eyes had run down their cheeks ... their mouths were
swollen, pus-covered wounds, which they could not bear to stretch
enough to admit the spout of a teapot.32
From what we already know about Hiroshima, it is evident that
even the most limited nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan
would spell utter catastrophe. The immediate effects of the explo-
32. JOHN HERSEY, HIROSHIMA 68 (1946) (recounting the aftermath of the
atomic bombings of Hiroshima).
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sions, including thermal radiation, nuclear radiation, and blast dam-
age, would cause widespread death and destruction.'
In the aftermath, those few surviving medical facilities would be
taxed beyond endurance. Water supplies would become unusable as
a result of fallout contamination. Housing and shelter would become
unavailable for hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of survi-
vors. Transportation and communication would break down to the
most rudimentary levels. Severe food shortages would be inevita-
ble.Y
Additionally, India's and Pakistan's networks of interlocking and
interdependent exchange systems would be shattered. Virtually eve-
ryone would be deprived of the basic means of livelihood. Emer-
gency police and fire services would be decimated and stressed to
wholly ineffectual levels. All systems dependent upon electrical
power would cease to function.
The severe trauma associated with such destruction would occa-
sion widespread disorientation and psychological disorders for which
there would be no therapeutic services. At the time of their initial
suffering, the survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki reacted to the
otherworldly grotesqueness of their condition with what psychiatrists
have called "death in life." Witnessing the appearance of long lines
of severely burned, literally melting, ghosts, the survivors found
themselves, in Bruno Bettelheim's words, an "anonymous mass," or
in the Japanese term, muga-muchu, "without self, without a center."
This understanding is incorporated in the Japanese term for atomic
33. See TOM STONIER, NUCLEAR DISASTER 54 (1964) (describing the physical
effects of an atomic blast). Victims would suffer flash and flame bums. Retinal bums
could occur in the eyes of persons at distances as great as a hundred miles from the
explosion. Some would be crushed by collapsing buildings and tom to shreds by fly-
ing glass, while others would fall victim to raging firestorms and conflagrations. Fall-
out injuries would include whole-body radiation injury, produced by penetrating, hard
gamma radiation; superficial radiation bums produced by soft radiation; and injuries
produced by deposits of radioactive substances within the body. See id.
34. See ROBERT JAY LIFTON, DEATH IN LIFE: SURVIVORS OF HIROSHIMA 6-7
(1967) (arguing that the total disruption of individual and social order, of one's
customary personal and community supports produced consequences that went far
beyond immediate physical and emotional suffering).
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bomb survivors, hibakusha, which delineates four categories of vic-
tims. " According to Dr. Lifton, these categories include:
[T]hose who at the time of the bomb were within the city limits of Hi-
roshima as then defined; those who came into the city within fourteen
days and entered a designated area extending to about two thousand me-
ters from the hypocenter; those who came into physical contact with
bomb victims, through various forms of aid or disposal of bodies; and
those who were in utero at the time, and whose mothers fit into any of the
36
first three groups.
The effects of Hiroshima were not confined to the immediate or
even long-term experiences of those who bore witness, but extended
as well to their rescuers, to their progeny, and even to the progeny of
their rescuers. Perhaps it is not unreasonable to expand the category
of hibakusha to include the children of Japanese mothers who do not
fit into one of the three above-mentioned groups, post-World War II
generations of Americans who share the historic burden, or even
humankind as a whole.
B. PREDICTING THE FUTURE: INDIA AND PAKISTAN
Following a nuclear war between India and Pakistan, normal soci-
ety would cease to function and would remain chaotic for many
years to come. The pestilence of unrestrained murder and banditry
would augment the pestilence of plague and epidemics. With the
passage of time, many of the survivors could expect an increased in-
cidence of degenerative diseases, various kinds of cancer, premature
death, impairment of vision, and increased sterility. Among the sur-
vivors of Hiroshima, for example, an increased incidence of leuke-
mia and cancer of the lung, stomach, breast, ovary, and cervix has
been widely documented.
3 7
Many of the most delicately balanced relationships in nature
would also be upset by the extensive fallout. In this regard, Indians
and Pakistanis who survive a nuclear exchange would likely have to
35. See id. at 7 (stating that this feeling of anonymity is incorporated into the
Japanese term for atomic survivors, hibakusha).
36. Id. at 6-7.
37. See STONIER, supra note 33, at 112.
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deal with enlarged and voracious insect populations. According to
biologist Tom Stonier:
Mushrooming insect populations are likely to spread from the radiation-
damaged areas in which they arose, and, like the locusts of biblical times,
wreak havoc in previously undamaged areas. Accompanying the insect
plagues would be the plant diseases transmitted by insects, particularly
those diseases which attack plants that have been injured or weakened by
insect or radiation damage. The combined assault of radiation, insects,
disease, and fire could temporarily strip off the plant cover of vast areas.
If the attack is sufficiently widespread, it is conceivable that a few years
later almost all the forests would have been destroyed, and most of the
countryside would have become converted into marginal grasslands, if not
actually stripped, leaving a naked earth to be ravaged by the ever-present
forces of erosion.
It is also certain that the biological and ecological effects of a nu-
clear war would be felt by other states in the region. Radioactive
fallout does not respect political boundaries. For yields in the low-
kiloton range, the fallout cloud would remain in the lower atmos-
phere, and its effects would likely remain local. That is, these effects
would not extend beyond the boundaries of the combatant states. But
for yields exceeding thirty kilotons, parts of the clouds of radioactive
debris would "punch" into the stratosphere, affecting non-combatant
states as well.39
Moreover, throughout the South Asian region, tens of thousands of
rotting, unburied corpses would create an enormous health threat. In
38. Id. at 135. See also Herbert Abrams & William E. Von Kaenel, Potential
for Spread of Epidemic Disease in the Aftermath of Nuclear Conflict, 305 NEW
ENG. J. MED. 1226, 1228 (1981 ) (presenting a stark and sobering assessment of the
potential for an explosive growth of insect populations following a nuclear ex-
change). The authors assert:
The fact that insects are generally more resistant to radiation than humans, along with
the prevalence of corpses, waste, and untreated sewage, the depletion of birds, and the
destruction of insecticide stocks and production, will engender a huge increase in in-
sect growth. Mosquitoes would multiply rapidly after an attack. The fly population
would explode. Most domestic animals and wild creatures would be killed. Trillions of
flies would breed in the dead bodies. Uncontrolled growth in the insect population may
sharply limit the capacity to control such diseases as typhus, malaria, dengue fever and
encephalitis.
Id.
39. See UNITED STATES ARMS AND DISARMAMENT AGENCY, supra note 9, at 7.
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many areas, radiation levels would be so high that corpses could re-
main untouched for weeks or even months. With transportation de-
stroyed, survivors weakened, and myriad post-war reconstruction
tasks to be performed, corpse disposal would be difficult, if not im-
possible. In order to bury the dead, areas even larger than India's and
Pakistan's now destroyed cities could be required for the cemetery.
CONCLUSION
Fear and reality go together naturally. Unless both Indian and
Pakistani decision-makers come to acknowledge the mutually intol-
erable consequences of a nuclear war in South Asia, they may begin
to think of nuclear weapons not as instruments of deterrence, but as
"ordinary" implements of warfighting. ° With such an erroneous
view, reinforced by underlying commitments to Realpolitik ' and na-
tionalistic fervor, 2 they might even begin to take steps toward the
atomic brink from which retreat would no longer be possible.
"In a dark time," says the poet Theodore Roethke, "the eye begins
to see."43 Embedded in this ironic observation is an important mes-
40. In considering the operation of deterrence in the South Asian theatre, it is im-
portant to note that such deterrence may determine the adequacy of pertinent interna-
tional law. The adequacy of international law in preventing an India-Pakistan nuclear
war will depend in large part upon the success or failure of pertinent country strategies
in the region. Thus, these strategies must be considered an essential component of in-
ternational law.
41. The presumed obligation to rely upon armed force in a world of international
anarchy-the Westphalian System-forms the central argument of Realpolitik. From
the Melian Dialogues of Thucydides, to Cicero, to Machiavelli, to Locke, to Spyk-
man, to Kissinger, this obligation is taken as uncontestable and irrevocable: "For what
can be done against force without force?" asks Cicero, in one of his Letters. E.G.
SIHLER, CICERO OF ARPINUM (1969). Later, in our own century, Nicholas Spykman
replies: "In a world of international anarchy, foreign policy must aim above all at the
improvement or at least the preservation of the relative power position of the state."
NICHOLAS JOHN SPYKMAN, AMERICA'S STRATEGY IN WORLD POLITICS 41 (1942).
42. Large numbers of both Indians and Pakistanis appear to favor these steps.
Television news cameras in each capital, following the respective announcements of
successful nuclear tests, recorded decidedly impassioned expressions of nationalist
pride. Perhaps the reason for such belligerent chauvinism is that "[i]ndividual man
sees in his country the realization of his earthly immortality." HEINRICH VON
TREITSCHKE, LECTURES ON POLITICS 205 (Blanche Dugdale & Torben de Bille trans.,
1916).
43. ROBERT JAY LIFTON, THE NAZI DOCTORS 466 (1986) (quoting Theodore
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sage for India and Pakistan. Look closely at the expected conse-
quences of a nuclear war. Look closely at the available "arsenal" of
international legal measures, at available treaties, customs, and gen-
eral principles.i Do not be lulled into complacence by anesthetized
and sanitized accounts of nuclear warfighting. Acknowledge the
mutually beneficial expectations of world order."
On the Indian subcontinent, nuclear war would inevitably be an
incurable disease. The only hope for such a terminal illness lies in
prevention, perhaps through the creation of a South Asian security
regime.46 For both India and Pakistan, there can be absolutely no
meaningful idea of "victory" associated with nuclear war. The idea
that the concept of "victory" has no place in a nuclear war is as old
as the Atomic Age. Long before the Atomic Age, certain philoso-
Roethke); see also THEODORE ROETHKE, hi a Dark Time. in COLLECTED POEMS
239 (1966).
44. Norms of customary international law bind all states regardless of whether a
State has ratified the pertinent codifying instrument or treaty. International law com-
partmentalizes apparently identical rights and obligations arising both out of custom-
ary lav and treaty law. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar v. U.S.). 1986
I.C.J. 4, 95 (June 27) (discussing the co-existence of similar rights and obligations un-
der international customary law). The court stated that -[e]ven if two norms belonging
to two sources of international law appear identical in content, and even if the states in
question are bound by these rules both on the level of treaty-law and that of customary
international law, these norms retain a separate existence." h1.
45. See generally GRENVILLE CLARK & Louis SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH
WORLD LAW xi-xxxi (1966) (explaining the concept of "world order"). See also
Louis RENE BERES & HARRY R. TARG, CONSTRUCTING ALTERNATIVE WORLD
FUTURES: REORDERING THE PLANET (1977); Louis Ren6 Beres, Reordering the
Planet: Thie Four Phases of World Order Design, in PLANNING ALTERNATIVE WORLD
FUTURES: VALUES, METHODS AND MODELS 50, 50-59 (Louis Ren6 Beres & Harry R.
Targ eds., 1975); Louis RENt BERES, PEOPLE, STATES AND WORLD ORDER (1981);
Louis RENE BERES, REASON AND REALPOLITIK: U.S. FOREIGN POLICY AND WORLD
ORDER (1984).
46. A security regime identifies "those principles, rules, and norms that permit
nations to be restrained in their behavior in the belief that others will reciprocate. This
concept implies not only norms and expectations that facilitate cooperation, but a form
of cooperation that is more than the following of short-run self-interest." Jervis, supra
note 18, at 173. It follows from this definition that an effective South Asian security
regime will have to overcome the so-called "tragedy of the commons" between India
and Pakistan. This is the problem of decision that arises among states when the bene-
fits of cooperation are contingent upon the expectation of reciprocity. See Garret Har-
din, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 124348 (1968) (popularizing this "trag-
edy"). See also Louis Ren6 Beres, Bipolarity. hltipolarity and the Tragedy ol'the
Commons, 26 W. POL. Q. 649, 649-50 (1973).
1998]
AM. U. INT'L L. REV.
phers and military strategists probed the idea of victory with rea-
soned sensitivity. Machiavelli, for example, recognized the principle
of an "economy of violence" that distinguishes between creativity
and destruction. Machiavelli understood the differences between
violence and power.47 Later, Hannah Arendt reflected on this distinc-
tion, elucidating a situation wherein the technical development of the
implements of violence had outstripped any rational justifications for
their use in armed conflict. Hence, said Arendt, war in the atomic age
is no longer the final arbiter in world politics, but rather an apoca-
lyptic chess game that can bear no resemblance to earlier games of
power and hegemony. In such a game, if either wins, both lose. "
Even Clausewitz understood, before the nuclear age, that war must
always be undertaken with reference to postwar benefit, and that the
principle of "utmost force" must always be qualified by reference to
the "political object." Moreover, B.H. Liddell-Hart stated:
The object in war is to attain a better peace - even if only from your own
point of view. Hence, it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to
the peace you desire. This is the truth underlying Clausewitz's definition
of war as 'a continuation of policy by other means' - the prolongation of
that policy through war into the subsequent peace must always be borne
in mind. A state which expends its strength to the point of exhaustion
bankrupts its own policy and future.4 9
Furthermore,
[vJictory in the true sense implies that the state of peace, and of one's
people, is better after the war than before. Victory in this sense is only
possible if a quick result can be gained or if a long effort can be economi-
cally proportioned to the national resources. The end must be adjusted to
the means. Failing a fair prospect of such a victory, wise statesmanship
will miss no opportunity for negotiating peace. Peace through stalemate,
based on a coincident recognition by each side of the opponent's strength,
47. See SHELDON S. WOLIN, POLITICS AND VISION: CONTINUITY AND
INNOVATION IN WESTERN POLITICAL THOUGHT 195-238 (1960) (discussing Machia-
velli's views regarding power and violence).
48. See HANNAH ARENDT, ON VIOLENCE 3 (1970).
49. B.H. LIDDELL-HART, STRATEGY 353 (1974)
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is at least preferable to peace through common exhaustion - and has often
provided a better foundation for lasting peace."'
Finally, we may recall the words of Henry Kissinger: "In the nu-
clear age, victory has lost its traditional significance. The outbreak of
war is increasingly considered the worst catastrophe. Henceforth, the
adequacy of any military establishment will be tested by its ability to
preserve the peace." The adequacy of the respective military estab-
lishments of both India and Pakistan can now be demonstrated only
by their ability to preserve the peace.
50. Id. at 357.
51. HENRY KISSINGER, THE NECESSITY FOR CHOICE: PROSPECTS OF AMERICAN
FOREIGN POLICY 12 (1962).
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